What Is the Art of Command and the Science of Control
Affiliate 1 Control and Command
The essential task of commanders is applying the art and science of war to the command and control of Regular army forces. The commander's control and command organization enables him to use his authority to accomplish the mission and see to the wellness and welfare of subordinates. Using his command and command system, the commander directs the deportment of his forces and imposes his volition on the enemy. Through control and control, the commander initiates the actions of, influences, and synchronizes the elements of gainsay power to impose his will on the situation and defeat the enemy.
NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
| one-1. To exercise effective command and control (C2), commanders must beginning understand its nature. This includes its definition, its importance and purpose, the relationship between control and control within C2, the components of C2, and how the commander's C2 organisation supports the commander. |
DEFINITION OF Control AND Control
| 1-2. Command and command is the do of potency and direction past a properly designated commander over assigned and fastened forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a control and control organisation. This definition leads to several conclusions (see figure 1-1):
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Figure 1-1. Control and Control
| 1-3. Effective C2 has the following characteristics:
However, fifty-fifty commanders who exercise the virtually effective C2 cannot eliminate dubiousness and create precise, mechanistic, predictable order. ane-4. Commanders exercise C2 in a dynamic environment, where unexpected opportunities and threats rapidly nowadays themselves. Commanders-through their C2 systems-use the military decisionmaking process to establish their commander's intent and allocate resource. (Commanders at lower echelons employ troop leading procedures.) (Run across FM five-0.) To implement their decisions, commanders direct coordinated actions by their forces that together attain the mission. Staffs use C2 processes to back up their commanders' decisions. They use data direction to collect, process, display, store, and disseminate relevant information (RI). They build a COP to provide situational understanding that supports unity of effort throughout the force. (Meet chapter 3.) Finally, commanders, assisted by their staffs, appraise execution and consequence orders that adjust their plans to business relationship for changes in the situation. i-5. C2 is unique among the battlefield operating systems (Boss): while the other Dominate focus resources against the enemy or environment, C2 focuses resources on integrating the activities of the other Dominate. Even though it involves no killing, detection, or resupply, C2 is a force multiplier and vital to mission accomplishment. C2 accomplishes the post-obit:
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Relationship Betwixt Command AND CONTROL
| ane-vi. Command and command are interrelated. Control resides with commanders. It consists of potency, decisionmaking, and leadership. Control is mostly art just some science. Command is how commanders execute command. It is mostly science but besides art. 1-7. Science deals with the report and method of a body of facts and processes based on principles from the physical or material world. Fine art, equally opposed to scientific discipline, requires expert performance of a specific skill using intuitive faculties that cannot be solely learned by study or instruction. Doctrine contains a science component that deals with the capabilities and limitations of the physical ways used in operations. Knowledge of doctrine's science component is essential. Coupled with experience and training, it forms the basis for the fine art in human being judgment necessary when applying doctrine to a specific state of affairs. However, doctrine cannot be reduced to scientific discipline; it is inherently fine art. i-eight. Commanders cannot exercise command effectively without control. Conversely, control has no office without command to focus it. Command is primary, merely it is insufficient without control. C2 is not a one-mode, peak-down procedure that imposes control on subordinates. C2 is multidirectional, with feedback influencing commanders from below, from above, and laterally. ane-9. Command focuses the practice and organisation of the science inside control. Command informs the exercise of fine art within control and regulates the functions of the force. Higher echelon organizations are more than complex than lower echelon organizations. Even so, the functions and related requirements of command remain comparatively abiding, while command functions increase at each higher echelon. At higher echelons, the impact of commanders is more indirect, while the roles of staffs and other elements of the C2 arrangement are more prominent. This situation requires higher echelon commanders to apply organizational, as well equally directly, leadership skills and actions. (FM 22-100 discusses the levels of leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic.) |
Command
| 1-x. Command is the dominance that a commander in the war machine lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibleness for finer using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the achievement of assigned missions. Information technology likewise includes responsibleness for health, welfare, morale, and subject field of assigned personnel (JP 0-2). The elements of command are authority, decisionmaking, and leadership. 1-11. Authorisation. Authority is the delegated power to estimate, deed, or command. It includes responsibility, accountability, and delegation. Commanders utilise the fine art of command in applying dominance equally they decide (plan how to achieve the end state) and pb (direct their forces during preparation and execution). 1-12. Decisionmaking. Decisionmaking is selecting a course of action equally the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. It translates the products of the commander's visualization (run into affiliate 4) into activeness. Decisionmaking includes knowing if to make up one's mind, then when and what to decide, and understanding the consequences of decisions. It is both fine art and science. Commanders utilize visualizing, describing, and directing to determine and communicate their decisions. 1-13. Leadership. Leadership is influencing people-by providing purpose, direction, and motivation-while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (FM 22-100). Commanders pb through a combination of instance, persuasion, and coercion. The leadership of commanders ultimately includes strength of will. (Run across FM 22-100.) i-fourteen. In any command, only one officer commands. This is embodied in the principle of war, unity of command. Commanders may exercise command through others by delegating authorisation; however, delegation does not absolve commanders of their responsibilities to the higher commander. Commanders initiate action past issuing lawful orders. |
Control
| 1-15. Success in control is impossible without control. Within command and command, control is the regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander'due south intent. It includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating relevant information for creating the common operational picture, and using data, primarily by the staff, during the operations process. Control allows commanders to disseminate their commander'due south intent, execute decisions, and adjust their operations to reflect irresolute reality and enemy actions. It allows commanders to change their commander'south visualization to business relationship for changing circumstances. Control also allows commanders to identify times and points requiring new decisions during grooming and execution. The elements of control are-
1-16. Information. Data, in the general sense, is the meaning humans assign to information. It is the almost important element of control and is divided into the categories of the cognitive hierarchy, based on the meaning assigned to information technology. (Encounter appendix B.) Relevant data is all information of importance to the commander and staff in the practice of command and control (FM iii-0). It is a commander's most of import C2 resource. Intelligence is an of import and distinct subset of relevant data; information technology exists in all categories of the cerebral bureaucracy and is integrated throughout C2. i-17. Information (including intelligence) from all echelons generates the COP. All users share it. By applying judgment to the COP, commanders achieve situational understanding and make decisions. 1-18. Situational agreement is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the COP to decide the relationships among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). It facilitates decisionmaking by identifying opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to mission accomplishment and the strength, and gaps in information. 1-19. At the same time the commander uses his situational agreement for C2, he tries to affect the situational understanding of the enemy (limiting its quantity or quality) and tries to influence the perceptions and actions of others (public or private organizations that influence the success of his functioning). These considerations direct relate to information operations, equally discussed in FM 3-13. 1-20. Execution information is information that communicates a decision and directs, initiates, or governs activity, comport, or procedure. Commanders direct by disseminating execution information, typically every bit orders and plans. In the process, they receive feedback from subordinates and supporting forces. This information flow creates the interactive influence between commanders and their subordinate forces feature of effective C2. one-21. Advice. To communicate means to use any means or method to convey data of whatsoever kind from one person or identify to another (JP 1-02). Communication allows organizations to disseminate and share information among people, elements, and places. Information for control flows vertically (between echelons) and horizontally (among elements of a single echelon). Effective communication is essential to achieving effective C2. 1-22. Structure. Commanders found and maintain control with a structure. As an element of control, structure is a defined organization that establishes relationships amid its elements or a process that establishes relationships among its activities. Structures are both internal (such as a headquarters or control post) and external (such as command and support relationships among subordinate forces). Relationships among activities may too be internal (techniques and procedures) or external (tactics and plans). |
COMPONENTS OF Control AND CONTROL
| one-23. C2 consists of ii components: the commander and his C2 system. (See figure one-1.) Commanders use their control and command systems to do C2 over forces to accomplish missions. |
The Commander
| ane-24. In units at all levels, the commander is the key individual in command and control. Commanders combine the fine art of command and the science of control to exercise C2. They create positive command climates that inculcate and foster trust and mutual understanding. They train their subordinates in C2. Using their C2 systems, commanders exercise C2 to straight operations. In every command, the commander is the focal point for penetrating the fog of war, overcoming its unceasing friction, and instilling in soldiers the will to win. ane-25. Commanders, helped past staffs, visualize operations, depict them in terms of the commander'due south intent and planning guidance, and straight the actions of subordinates within their commander'southward intent. (See chapter 4.) Commanders cannot perform these leader actions from a reckoner screen at the command post. They must direct influence operations by their personal presence at times and places of their choosing, and by skillfully using their C2 systems. |
Command and Command Organisation
| one-26. Commanders cannot exercise C2 alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. Even at the lowest levels, commanders need support, however niggling, to exercise C2 effectively. At every echelon of command, each commander has a control and control system to provide that support. A command and control system is the arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. Digitized information systems now being fielded will increase the complexity of C2 systems but will provide commanders with more timely and accurate RI. 1-27. Personnel. The C2 system begins with people. Since combat involves soldiers, no corporeality of technology tin reduce the importance of the homo dimension. (See FM 22-100.) Therefore, commanders base their practice of C2 on human characteristics more than on equipment and procedures. Trained C2 personnel are essential to effective C2 systems; the best technology cannot support C2 without them. i-28. Information Management. Information management is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable course to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data (FM iii-0). Information management consists of RI and information systems (INFOSYS). Information systems are the equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate data. These include computers-hardware and software-and communications, every bit well as policies and procedures for their utilise (FM three-0). 1-29. Procedures. Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task (FM 3-ninety). Procedures govern actions inside a C2 system to make it more constructive and efficient. Adhering to procedures minimizes defoliation, misunderstanding, and hesitance as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to meet operational requirements. 1-30. Equipment and Facilities. Equipment and facilities provide sustainment and a piece of work surround for the other elements of a C2 system. Facilities vary in size and complexity. At the lowest echelon, the "facility" may exist the commander'due south bunker or vehicle. At the highest echelons, facilities are large and complex. 1-31. Digitization's Furnishings on C2 Systems. Every bit the Army moves towards more than digitized INFOSYS, the manner in which these emerging digital technologies combine has the potential to provide more than timely, accurate, and reliable RI to commanders. This RI will let commanders to make faster and amend decisions. ane-32. Digital INFOSYS also back up efficient and constructive execution by reducing the man labor needed to organize information and put it in a usable form. Used correctly, their capabilities let commanders and staffs to spend more than time and energy on the art and human dimensions of C2. These powerful capabilities support mission command. (See paragraph i-67.) 1-33. Staffs provide commanders with RI in usable forms that help commanders achieve accurate situational understanding. Timely, relevant, and usable RI enables commanders to make timely decisions and allows staffs to rapidly synchronize, integrate, and fuse actions in accordance with the commander's intent. Staff elements use their corresponding BOS INFOSYS to manage BOS-specific RI. They apply continuous analysis to better the quality of RI they give commanders. |
EXERCISING Command AND CONTROL
| i-34. Commanders must place their C2 system into action to practise C2. Exercising C2 takes place dynamically throughout the operations procedure. (See FM three-0.) The operations-procedure activities of planning, preparing for, executing, and continuously assessing are cyclical and continuous. They practice non necessarily occur sequentially. (See effigy 1-2.) For case, while preparing for or executing one operation, units plan branches and sequels for the next functioning. At any time, subordinate units of the same control may be performing different operations-process activities. 1-35. The operations process focuses on executing rather than planning. Mod INFOSYS reduce the time needed to plan. This allows commanders to classify more than fourth dimension for preparation and to execute sooner. INFOSYS do this in two means: First, they allow almost simultaneous planning-collaborative and parallel-among echelons. This adequacy compresses the time needed for all echelons to complete their plans. Second, because INFOSYS provide nearly continuous updates to a more than accurate COP, forces tin execute faster with less detailed plans. High quality COP updates make effective incremental adjustments possible during execution. They as well allow commanders to act faster to counter emerging threats or seize opportunities every bit they identify them rather than continuing to execute a plan that does not fit the new situation. In addition, modern INFOSYS allow staffs to rapidly resynchronize forces and functions. This adequacy allows commanders to adjust plans with a minimal loss of combat power, making Army forces more agile today than previously. |
Figure ane-2. The Operations Procedure
| 1-36. Commanders follow a continuous cycle of see first, understand first, act start, and terminate decisively to decrease the options available to the enemy and create or preserve options for their own forces. (See effigy 1-3.) Commanders, assisted by their C2 systems, aim to see offset inside the battlespace. Next, collaboration, word, and sharing of knowledge related to the COP allow them to empathise get-go. Agreement includes discerning the intent of enemies and others who endeavor to shape Army force operations to their benefit or to friendly disadvantage. Seeing and understanding first are necessary but not sufficient without acting beginning. Commanders, using their C2 systems, synchronize and integrate their combined arms teams while directing execution within their commander's intent and planning guidance. Finally, Army forces finish decisively by applying relentless pressure, post-obit up, and exploiting initial blows. Throughout operations, subordinates exercise subordinates' initiative. (Run across paragraph 1-68.) |
ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND AND Control
| 1-37. Military operations are circuitous-a circuitous friendly arrangement fiercely competes with a complex enemy system. Each system consists of numerous components that may too be complex systems, each interacting and affecting many other systems. The results of those interactions are complicated, ofttimes unpredictable, and perhaps uncontrollable. Thus, military operations may defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. The post-obit four dimensions of the C2 surroundings help explain the complex nature of military operations:
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Figure 1-three. The Thought Procedure
HUMAN DIMENSION
| 1-38. The nigh of import dimension of the C2 environment is the human dimension. People are the basis of armed forces organizations, and military operations occur as human interactions. Humans are integral to C2 at all levels: commanders, personnel in the C2 organization, and forces the commander directs. INFOSYS aid soldiers attain missions effectively, just do not eliminate or lessen the office of humans. The human being mind has a capacity for judgment, intuition, and imagination far superior to the analytic chapters of the most powerful reckoner. This attribute makes command more an art than a science. Effective C2 accounts for the characteristics and limits of human nature. Information technology exploits and enhances uniquely human skills. No amount of technology or equipment tin can supplant the human spirit and reasoned judgment, especially those of commanders. 1-39. Battle is chaotic-unexpected problems occur. The most of import cistron contributing to this chaos is the deportment of enemies actively trying to accomplish their missions by defeating friendly forces. This factor alone creates stress. A capable enemy tries to maximize the level of stress on friendly forces. That, combined with the often nonstop tempo of modern operations raises the stress on individuals and systems to levels that may go crippling unless planning includes countermeasures. Fifty-fifty in stability operations and support operations-where there is less potential for the moments of stark terror that be in battle-abiding tension over time can lead to unexpected problems. Effective commanders solve these issues themselves where possible, allowing higher-level commanders to focus on broader operations. Nonetheless, they coordinate their solutions with other units or echelons to synchronize them with the actions of those elements. 1-xl. Stress affects all soldiers, from commanders on downwardly. The harsh environment of operations produces physiological and psychological furnishings. Hardened soldiers can persevere physically if their commanders train, fix, and care for them in such conditions. Even so, the harsh environment of operations is more likely to have a greater psychological than physical upshot on soldiers. Since the listen directly affects the soldier'southward will to win, soldiers must prepare mentally for the stress of operations, peculiarly combat. If not countered, stress causes human being error, increasing uncertainty or increasing time required for actions to accept effect. Effective C2 too recognizes and addresses the effects of stress on individual soldiers and units. (FM 6-22.5 discusses stress, its effects, and preventive measures. FM 22-100 discusses leader responsibilities for handling stress in soldiers and units. It as well outlines methods to create effective, gainsay-ready soldier teams.) |
Dubiety
| i-41. The defining problem of command and control is the need to bargain with dubiousness, some other dimension that makes C2 more art than science. In the words of Carl von Clausewitz,
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Sources of Dubiousness
| 1-42. The fundamentally circuitous and interactive nature of war machine operations generates doubt. Military operations are human endeavors shaped past human nature and subject to the unpredictability of man behavior. Even the behavior of friendly forces is oftentimes unpredictable considering of the furnishings of stress on soldiers. Humans sometimes brand mistakes as they interact. In addition, each armed services performance is a circuitous activity composed of smaller operations, each involving many individuals and systems acting simultaneously in complex environments. Factors such as the urban environment, restrictive rules of engagement, and political considerations produce unanticipated and unintended consequences that result in boosted uncertainty. one-43. Military operations are struggles between independent homo wills. Commanders face thinking, uncooperative, and adaptive enemies. They can never predict with certainty how enemies will act and react, or how events volition develop. Enemies employ methods like denying information to friendly forces, disseminating disinformation, and executing military deception operations to attempt to shape the area of operations and reduce or neutralize friendly force capabilities. Simultaneously, friendly forces use information operations to do the same to the enemy. (Encounter FM 3-13.) These deportment interact to create an surround of extraordinary doubtfulness. |
Information Management and Incertitude
| one-44. C2 systems strive to reduce incertitude to manageable levels by collecting and processing information, and providing commanders only the information they need to make decisions. However, constructive commanders accept that uncertainty can never be eliminated. Therefore, commanders and their C2 systems must be able to function finer in uncertain environments. The all-time method of doing this is through decentralized execution of operations. Decentralized execution-based on a common understanding of the commander's intent, mission orders, and sharing available data-allows lower level commanders to cope with uncertainty past exercising subordinates' initiative. 1-45. Well-trained staffs within mature C2 systems use information direction to reduce uncertainty. (See chapter 3.) The goal is to provide commanders with cognition based on RI to which they can apply judgment to reach situational agreement and discern operational advantages. To do this, commanders and staffs residuum fine art and scientific discipline within information management. Higher up all, decreased doubtfulness depends not only on the quantity or quality of information simply also on the analysis of it. These limitations are particularly true of intelligence, which is based on information collected from an uncooperative enemy. 1-46. Faulty information direction may increase uncertainty. Information but reduces uncertainty if it contributes to cognition or understanding. Neither humans nor systems can effectively take any more a sure corporeality information. Across that point, more information only leads to information overload, a situation in which incoming data-no matter how relevant or authentic-may not be understood. |
Solutions to Uncertainty
| 1-47. At that place are 2 basic solutions to the trouble of doubtfulness: 1 is information-focused, the other action-focused. ane-48. The information-focused solution reduces uncertainty at the higher echelons by collecting more and ameliorate data, and increasing the information-processing capability at the pinnacle. This solution results in greater uncertainty at lower echelons because those echelons either do not have the information or receive information technology after than the higher ones. This approach requires greater control of lower-level commanders and more detailed orders. i-49. The activeness-focused solution reduces dubiety evenly throughout the force. Commanders railroad train their organizations to manage and cope with doubtfulness equally part of normal operations. They consul authority for decisionmaking to those levels that tin acquire and procedure the information adequately. This solution may consequence in less certainty at higher levels. 1-l. The activity-focused solution leads to more than general, flexible orders and a more agile force. The data-focused solution may not be as efficient as the action-focused solution considering fifty-fifty increased information collection does not provide absolute certainty. Although focusing information processing at the height can produce enough data to execute operations, information technology may cost the efficiency and fourth dimension. Commanders employ aspects of both solutions. They practice not totally exclude one or the other. Tension arises between the two solutions only when commanders allow the quest for more and better information to delay their decisions. |
Fourth dimension
| 1-51. The dimension of fourth dimension is important but in relation to friendly forces' accomplishing the mission. In combat operations, how fast the enemy tin react effectively to friendly actions is the main attribute of time commanders consider. In stability operations and back up operations, other considerations, such as forecasted environmental effects, decide the importance of time. one-52. Time affects C2 in two major ways: First, friendly forces must be able to behave (plan, fix, execute, and assess) operations faster than the enemy. Second, a C2 organisation can theoretically reduce incertitude by standing to gather and procedure information; however, the value of information about the enemy decreases with age-changes in the situation tin arrive irrelevant. A rapid tempo (rate of military activity) limits the amount of information that can be collected and processed before a determination is required. Delaying decisions beyond that limit allows enemies to act more rapidly than friendly forces and may give them the initiative. (Encounter chapter 6.) i-53. All actions require a sure corporeality of time to execute. This time tin can but be reduced to some absolute minimum. If the fourth dimension friendly forces demand to act is less than the enemy reaction fourth dimension, there is no problem. If information technology is greater, commanders seek another solution-by adjusting the resource, the concept, or even the mission. (Encounter the discussion of the discover-orient-decide-act [OODA] cycle in appendix A.) i-54. An constructive C2 system allows friendly commanders and their forces to utilise time more effectively than the enemy. The need of commanders to residuum reduction of uncertainty with tempo is the essence of the C2 challenge. Enemy commanders have the same goal and confront the aforementioned problems. The goal is to achieve relative reward in timeliness over them. Commanders who follow C2 practices that provide information to lower levels of command allow their subordinates to practice initiative and brand better decisions. Their forces operate faster and more finer than those of the enemy. |
1-15LAND COMBAT OPERATIONS
| 1-55. The Army's chief mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to behave prompt and sustained state combat operations. (Encounter FM 1.) These forces include Army aviation units as well as footing units. Ground forces C2 doctrine (which applies to the airspace over the land area of operations) is compatible with joint doctrine and takes into business relationship the nature of state operations and land forces. i-56. Army combat operations normally involve destroying or dislocating enemy forces on country or taking key state objectives that reduce the enemy's ability to conduct operations. Iv characteristics distinguish land combat operations:
These characteristics increment the doubtfulness of the environment in which Regular army forces conduct operations. Commanders prepare their forces to persevere through casualties and setbacks. They directly logistic support that anticipates losses and consumption. i-57. The scope of land combat reaches to the lowest tactical land-force element-its irreducible unit of maneuver and action-the individual soldier. These soldiers number in the thousands for a brigade commander and the tens of thousands for an operational-level commander. Soldiers receive orders passed through multiple echelons of command. They must understand the prescribed limits inside which to exercise subordinates initiative. In improver, lower-level commanders have much less experience and professional person education than college-level commanders. Yet, they must understand the college-level commander's intent and the effects of their deportment on the operations of the entire force. These factors produce an extremely circuitous situation. A commander's C2 system must communicate execution information in an understandable form to the command's everyman levels and disseminate the COP to all echelons. Information technology must allow commanders at all levels to share a mutual understanding of the state of affairs and higher commander's intent. 1-58. This situation means that reports transmitted through several layers may result in an inaccurate reception or interpretation. Communications with subordinates may exist tenuous, and information about subordinate formations may be vague, as the enemy tries to degrade or disrupt communications and the environment limits their reliability. The fielding of digital INFOSYS has a goal of reducing these furnishings and providing the adequacy to produce an accurate COP in spite of them. 1-59. The Army'due south doctrine of total spectrum operations emphasizes shattering the enemy's ability and will to resist, and destroying the coherence of his operations. Army forces reach these things by controlling the nature, telescopic, and tempo of an functioning, and striking simultaneously throughout the area of operations to command, neutralize, and destroy enemy forces and other objectives. The Army'southward C2 doctrine supports its operations doctrine. It balances coordination, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility. It stresses rapid decisionmaking and execution, including rapid response to changing situations. It emphasizes trust and mutual agreement among superiors and subordinates. ane-60. Commanders seek to acquit operations at a tempo and intensity the enemy cannot match. To accomplish this, Army C2 doctrine supports decentralized operations. Decentralized operations contribute to retaining the tactical initiative. They require disseminating information to the lowest possible level and then subordinates tin exercise subordinates' initiative. Effective C2 that emphasizes subordinates' initiative every bit the starting point for seizing the tactical initiative. Army C2 doctrine gives commanders the concepts needed to exercise this kind of C2. |
CONCEPT OF Command AND Command
| one-61. Historically, commanders have employed variations of 2 basic C2 concepts: mission command and detailed command. (See effigy i-4.) Militaries and commanders take oftentimes favored detailed command, but an understanding of the nature of war and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command. Mission command is the Ground forces's preferred concept of command and command. 1-62. Two hundred years ago, C2 practices were consistent with the concept of detailed control. C2 focused on searching for accurate information about enemy and friendly forces. A commander could generally see the entire battleground and most of his army, besides every bit the enemy's. Battles were often ended in one 24-hour interval. (Examples include the battles of Arbela and Kunersdorf.) This philosophy served well in earlier times; even so, the growth of armies in size and complication required commanders to control in battles that lasted longer than a day on battlefields that extended beyond their direct view. This change began in Napoleon's fourth dimension. Napoleon adult an organizational method-the corps d'armee system-to reduce the incertitude and complication while still employing detailed command methods. (Run across the Austerlitz vignette.) 1-63. Still, by the American Civil State of war, this trend was irreversible. This led American commanders in the latter years of the Civil State of war to utilize techniques like to mission command. (Meet the Chancellorsville vignette.) Past 1870, armies in Europe recognized the same trend, and the outset formulation of a concept of mission command, a High german concept later called Auftragstaktik, formally emerged. Later developments in technology, such equally the phone, led some commanders to attempt to exercise C2 through detailed command. Notwithstanding, the failure of detailed command-in World War I by all combatants and at the beginning of World War II past the French Army-led the German and American armies to employ mission control throughout World War Ii. (See the Ruhr vignette.) Afterwards Earth War II, the Israeli army adult into a proficient practitioner of mission command. |
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1-15Figure i-iv. Concepts of Control and Control
Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) was appointed Chief of the Prussian (afterwards German) General Staff in 1857. I of the important concepts he promulgated was Auftragstaktik (literally, "mission tactics"); a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic design. Moltke understood that, as war progressed, its uncertainties diminished the value of any detailed planning that might have been done beforehand. He believed that, beyond calculating the initial mobilization and concentration of forces, 1-15".no plan of operations extends with whatsoever degree of certainty beyond the get-go encounter with the principal enemy force." He believed that, throughout a entrada, commanders had to make decisions based on a fluid, constantly evolving situation. For Moltke, each major encounter had consequences that created a new situation, which became the basis for new measures. Auftragstaktik encouraged commanders to be flexible and react immediately to changes in the state of affairs as they developed. Information technology replaced detailed planning with delegation of decisionmaking authority to subordinate commanders within the context of the higher commander's intent. Moltke realized that tactical decisions had to be made on the spot; therefore, keen care was taken to encourage initiative by commanders at all levels. Moltke believed that commanders should effect only the most essential orders. These would provide only general instructions outlining the master objective and specific missions. Tactical details were left to subordinates. For Moltke, "The advantage which a commander thinks he tin attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a betoken where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them." Moltke's thought, summarized in these statements, lies at the heart of mission control.
| 1-64. As effigy 1-4 shows, the concepts of detailed command and mission command represent the theoretical extremes of a C2 spectrum. While the U.s. Army'due south preferred C2 concept is mission command, in practice no commander relies on purely detailed or purely mission command techniques. The degree to which commanders incorporate detailed command techniques into their practice of mission command depends on a variety of factors. These may include the nature of the surroundings or task, the qualities of the staff and subordinate commanders, and the nature and capabilities of the enemy. |
DETAILED Control
| 1-65. Detailed command stems from the conventionalities that success in battle comes from imposing society and certainty on the battlefield. A commander who practices detailed command seeks to achieve this by creating a powerful, efficient C2 organization able to process huge amounts of data, and by attempting to reduce virtually all unknowns to certainty. Detailed control centralizes information and decisionmaking authority. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit, and successful execution depends on strict obedience by subordinates, with minimal decisionmaking and initiative on their part. Information technology emphasizes vertical, linear data period, where information flows up the chain of command and orders flow down. The commander ensures compliance with all details of the plan by imposing discipline and coordination from above. Detailed command achieves unity of effort through detailed, prescriptive techniques. 1-66. Commanders who utilise this C2 concept command by personal direction or detailed directive. They make many-oftentimes as well many-decisions personally, not all of which are the important ones. Frequently, they make these decisions prematurely. Detailed command techniques may result in a high caste of coordination during planning. Notwithstanding, during execution, they leave fiddling room for contained adjustments by subordinates; subordinates must consult the college commander before deviating from the programme. Detailed command is sick-suited to taking reward of rapidly irresolute situations. It does not work well when the communications and information menstruum is disrupted. It inhibits the judgment, creativity, and initiative required for success in fluid armed services operations. Considering of these disadvantages, mission command is a better C2 concept in almost all cases. |
MISSION COMMAND
Commander's Intent
Subordinates' Initiative
| 1-69. Subordinates' initiative is the assumption of responsibleness for deciding and initiating independent deportment when the concept of operations no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to achieving the commander'due south intent presents itself. Subordinates decide how to achieve their missions within delegated freedom of action and practise initiative during execution, simply they have an accented responsibility to fulfill the commander's intent. They are too required, non merely permitted, to exercise initiative when an opportunity or threat presents itself. |
Mission Orders
| one-lxx. Mission orders is a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and activity in accomplishing missions and leaves the "how" of mission achievement to subordinates. Mission orders state the task organization, commander'due south intent and concept of operations, mission of the force, subordinates' missions, and minimum essential coordinating instructions. A mission assigned to a subordinate includes all the normal elements (who, what, when, where, and why), with particular emphasis on the purpose (why). It, along with the commander's intent, guides subordinates' initiative. A properly written mission argument and commander's intent are critical when using mission orders. This technique does not mean commanders do not supervise subordinates' execution; nevertheless, they intervene just to direct changes to the concept of operations, coordinate, restore operations, or exploit success. A poorly written mission statement or unclear commander's intent requires the commander to intervene in subordinate operations more frequently. Such intervention inhibits subordinates' initiative and reduces the force's agility. |
Resource Allocation
| 1-71. Commanders allocate enough resources for subordinates to accomplish their missions. In the context of mission command, commanders consider information a resource-comparable to more traditional ones, such as soldiers and materiel-and share it through all levels of command. |
Exercising Mission Control
| 1-72. Mission command concentrates on the objective of an operation, not on how to attain it. It emphasizes timely decisionmaking, understanding of the college commander's intent, and the clear responsibleness of subordinates to human activity within that intent to achieve the desired end state. With the commander'south intent to provide unity of effort, mission command relies on decentralized execution and subordinates' initiative. Mission command requires a common agreement of Ground forces doctrine, as well as of the situation and commander's intent. i-73. The fundamental basis of mission control is creating trust and common understanding betwixt superiors and subordinates. This is more than but control: commanders must establish a command climate of trust and mutual understanding that encourages subordinates to exercise initiative. Mission control applies to all operations across the spectrum of conflict. 1-74. Mission command counters the doubt of war past reducing the amount of certainty needed to human action. Commanders guide unity of attempt through the commander'due south intent, mission orders, and the CCIR. Commanders agree a "loose rein," allowing subordinates freedom of action and requiring them to exercise subordinates' initiative. Commanders make fewer decisions, simply this allows them to focus on the nigh important ones. The command operates more on self-discipline than imposed bailiwick. Because mission command decentralizes decisionmaking authority and grants subordinates significant liberty of action, information technology demands more of commanders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education. 1-75. Mission control tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Orders and plans are as cursory and uncomplicated as possible, relying on implicit communication-subordinates' ability to coordinate and the human being capacity to understand with minimal exact information exchange. By decentralizing decisionmaking potency, mission command increases tempo and improves the subordinates' ability to human activity in fluid and disorderly situations. Moreover, relying on implicit communication makes mission command less vulnerable to disruption of communications than detailed command. 1-76. On the surface, the characteristics of stability operations and support operations appear to favor detailed command. The aim of these operations is often persuasion rather than destruction of an enemy. Missions are more likely accomplished past preemption, dislocation, and disruption than by gainsay operations. Bachelor information appears more than consistent and clear, if not improve, than that received during offensive and defensive operations. There are normally fewer crises and more time bachelor to make decisions and take action. 1-77. Notwithstanding, the environment of stability operations and support operations is often as circuitous-if non as mortiferous-as that encountered during offensive operations and defensive operations. Both occur in dynamic environments that may involve applying doctrine in unfamiliar ways. Both are often time- and manpower-intensive, and both are oftentimes conducted in noncontiguous areas of operations. Both, but specially support operations, are often interagency. ane-78. Achieving unity of effort in this environment is hard but essential. A clear commander's intent that lower-level leaders can understand is key to maintaining unity of effort. Circumstances of remote locations or rapidly changing situations tin force commanders to acquit decentralized operations, and soldiers must practise subordinates' initiative to solve problems every bit they arise. One isolated, thoughtless action can undo months of patient work, potentially alienate the local populace, and benefit the belligerent'southward cause in stability operations or diminish the effects of support operations. ane-79. Mission control is advisable for operations in the ofttimes politically charged atmosphere and circuitous conditions of these operations. Commanders must explain not only the tasks assigned and their firsthand purpose, only also prescribe an atmosphere to achieve and maintain throughout the campaign. They must explain what to attain and communicate the rationale for war machine action throughout their commands. Doing this allows junior commanders and their soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and, about important, why the mission is being undertaken. 1-lxxx. Detailed command is ill-suited to the conditions of stability operations and support operations. Commanders using its techniques try to provide guidance or management for all conceivable contingencies, which is impossible in dynamic and circuitous environments. Nether detailed command, subordinates must refer to their headquarters when they run into situations non covered by the commander'due south guidance. Doing this increases the time required for decisions and delays acting. In addition, success in interagency operations ofttimes requires unity of try, even when there is non unity of command. In such an environment, detailed command is impossible. In contrast to the detailed instructions required by detailed control, mission command calls for a clear commander's intent. This commander's intent provides subordinates guidelines within which to obtain unity of effort with agencies non under military machine command. Subordinates then deed within those guidelines to contribute to achieving the desired end country. |
DIGITIZATION AND MISSION COMMAND
| 1-81. Digitization is the Ground forces's program for leveraging data-age technologies. Current and future INFOSYS improvements, such as the Army Boxing Control Organisation (ABCS) and Battle Command on the Motion (BCOTM), use digitization to heighten commanders' practice of the art of command and facilitate the science of control. The digitized INFOSYS the Ground forces is building actually facilitate and strengthen mission command, even though they can be used to impose detailed command. Their capabilities take the potential for creating disharmonize. A commander at almost any level can plainly accomplish down and control the actions of an individual soldier at whatsoever time. Doing this, all the same, misuses the engineering science. Constructive commanders focus on the overall operations of their forcefulness, not the individual actions of its parts. The information that digital INFOSYS make bachelor allows commanders to know what their subordinates are doing faster and in more detail than previously. Commanders can use this information to revisualize the overall operation and take reward of opportunities that results from their subordinates' actions, in keeping with mission command. 1-82. Commanders take faced this challenge before. In the late 1960s, command doctrine stated that the senior leader on the ground had the all-time perspective, and that commanders should lead from the front end. The helicopter and Prc-25 radio challenged this doctrine. This technology led some commanders to believe they could all-time control a fight on the footing from a command post overhead. Many succumbed to this temptation. Helicopters gave airborne commanders the illusion of having perfect knowledge of the basis situation. Lightweight radios led them to believe they could accomplish down and influence the battle directly, rather than assuasive their subordinates to do their jobs. The predictable results were erosion of trust and a weakening of the chain of command, along with a decline in junior officer and NCO willingness to initiate activeness without orders. Although there may have been a short-term increment in credible combat effectiveness of small units, the long-term effects of that misapplication of technology were devastating. 1-83. The perception of digitization in the Army is that it might reduce the importance of the art of command. Some believe that providing commanders ameliorate, more authentic, and timely data and intelligence would allow them to rely less on intuition. With more than authentic information, commanders would be better able to visualize the current and future states and dictate the terms, location, and tempo of the battle, even at lower echelons. If digital INFOSYS do provide these capabilities, the concept of mission command could be called into question. However, this line of questioning confuses the fine art of command with the scientific discipline of control. one-84. Data technologies are already affecting the elements of control: information, communication, and structure. Yet, they do not detract from the elements of command: say-so, decisionmaking, and leadership. In fact, commanders can employ digital INFOSYS to increment the effectiveness of decisionmaking and leading. Modern INFOSYS allow commanders to devote more time to the art and human sides of command, and to back up their achievement and use of visualization. These technologies and capabilities too let all BOSs beyond many distributed locations and echelons to share information and interact when analyzing that information. Never have commanders had more than ability to exercise increased straight control, yet never accept they had less reason to do and so. Data is the springboard of initiative and independent action. Using information technologies to empower subordinates has the potential to increment the tempo of operations across the level at which adversaries can hope to respond. i-85. Modern information systems (INFOSYS), such as the Ground forces Battle Control System (ABCS), essentially enable mission command. Higher up all, they let commanders to provide a COP to subordinates to guide the exercise of subordinates' initiative. The COP conveys the higher commander's perspective and facilitates subordinates' situational agreement. This situational understanding provides a context for subordinates to utilize when assessing information obtained at their level. The COP allows subordinates to visualize intuitively the effects of possible decisions on the remainder of the higher commander's operation and accept or mitigate the costs of their determination. As subordinates human activity, ABCS allows them to report the results of their actions to their commander. Higher commanders tin monitor subordinates' actions and, with their staffs, resynchronize operations rapidly to exploit opportunities resulting from subordinates' initiative. 1-86. Well-trained staffs with solid procedures can employ modern INFOSYS to facilitate understanding of the commander'due south intent. These INFOSYS provide graphic displays and the ways to obtain feedback from subordinates. This feedback becomes a two-way data period that leads to a shared situational understanding among all participants. This shared understanding forms the context for exercising subordinates' initiative. Commanders tin use the same capabilities to confirm or correct subordinates' agreement. This increases opportunities to exercise subordinates' initiative. 1-87. Digitization can substantially support the fine art of command by providing commanders better, more accurate, and timely information. This information gives commanders amend situational understanding. Better situational understanding allows commanders to focus their intuition on fewer unknowns and meliorate visualize the electric current and future end state. Modern INFOSYS let commanders to identify the unknowns and either precisely direct information collection or accept the doubtfulness in the interests of timeliness. Authentic information allows commanders to dictate the terms, location, and tempo of operations. It enables them to spend more than time and free energy leading and motivating soldiers. |
HISTORICAL VIGNETTE-CHANCELLORSVILLE
| i-88. The following historical vignette illustrates how one commander successfully used all 4 mission command techniques-commander's intent, subordinates' initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation-to defeat a more powerful opponent who relied on detailed command techniques. |
i-21Control and Control at Chancellorsville In December 1862, the Regular army of Northern Virginia, under Amalgamated GEN Robert E. Lee, defeated the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock River between Washington, DC and Richmond, Virginia. The Union Army, under its new commander, MG Joseph Hooker, spent the wintertime of 1863 recovering. By leap, Hooker and his regular army of 134,000 were prepared to resume the offensive against Lee and his army of sixty,000. 1-22"I not only expected victory, I expected to get the whole [Confederate] army," said Hooker of the Chancellorsville campaign. Instead, Chancellorsville became one of Lee'due south greatest victories. Hooker planned an envelopment to place stiff Union forces on Lee'south flanks and rear. Three infantry corps would move upwardly the Rappahannock, cross at Kelly'southward Ford, and motion against Lee's rear. Ii other corps would motility against Lee'southward right flank. Combined with a Union cavalry corps moving behind Lee to cut off Confederate supplies and reinforcements, these actions would turn Lee out of Fredericksburg. Nevertheless, fearing that the enemy might learn the details of his plan, Hooker withheld his intent from his subordinates. Instead he relied on detailed command techniques, an approach that prevented his subordinates from taking advantage of opportunities that could have led to victory. Initially, Union operations went co-ordinate to plan. (Run across map ane-1.) Spousal relationship disinformation, demonstrations, and feints initially misled Lee. By 29 April, Hooker had outmaneuvered him. The enveloping force had advanced to the road junction at Chancellorsville. A bridgehead below Fredericksburg was established, and 24,000 men under MG John Sedgwick were prepared to exploit it. However, events began to diverge from Hooker's commander's visualization, and his program began to unravel. By i May, Lee had recognized that the real threat was the enveloping force at Chancellorsville, non the Matrimony cavalry corps moving to his due south. Lee then fabricated a bold decision: apparently violating the principle of mass, he divided his force. Even though outnumbered, Lee left i-third of his forcefulness to defend Fredericksburg, sending the rest to bring together BG "Stonewall" Jackson at Chancellorsville. Lee gave Jackson no specific orders, just fabricated his intent clear: repulse the enemy and bulldoze him back to the Rapidan. (See map 1-2.) Jackson's skirmishers denied the Wedlock corps the power to communicate, link upwardly with one some other, and provide mutual support. Hooker's shut hold of his plans and intent was now particularly telling. The irresolute Sedgwick, isolated from the chief activeness, had no idea what he was supposed to do. And then, instead of fighting through the weak strength facing him to fall on Lee'southward rear, he waited for clarifying orders. Assessing the situation that afternoon, Hooker decided to fight a defensive battle, choosing the time and place of the encounter. He ordered the enveloping force to entrench around Chancellorsville and wait for Lee to attack. Map 1-2. Chancellorsville-Lee's Counter On 2 May, Lee realized Hooker's heart was also entrenched for an assault, but that his right flank corps was open and unsupported. Lee over again divided his force, deciding that the advantage of seizing the initiative and attacking merited the take a chance. Lee sent the bulk of his strength with Jackson, who moved to envelop Hooker's right. Lee correctly calculated that Hooker, in his desire for a defensive battle, would do nothing. Jackson came through the Wilderness, surprising and routing Hooker's right-flank corps. Jackson pushed on that nighttime to prevent the enemy from recovering, but in the defoliation was mortally wounded past friendly burn down. Hooker, nonetheless intending to fight a defensive battle until Sedgwick was in position, ordered Sedgwick to come upward on Lee's rear. Sedgwick, overly cautious, did not achieve this task. On three May, BG J.E.B. Stuart took over for Jackson. Lee'due south mission to Stuart was articulate: drive the Spousal relationship forces from Chancellorsville and reunite the two Confederate wings. Fierce fighting erupted to drive the Marriage forces from their positions. Hooker'southward defense force around Chancellorsville was breached (at high price to both sides), and the Confederate army reunited. Meanwhile, Sedgwick had overrun the Fredericksburg line, but ignorant of Hooker's intent, had non pursued the fleeing enemy. A dawn reconnaissance on 4 May confirmed that Hooker had withdrawn to new defensive positions northward of Chancellorsville. The twenty-four hour period earlier, Hooker had suffered a head injury that may take clouded his judgment. Hooker did not translate current situational developments accurately. He would not relinquish control and insisted that his defensive plans be carried out. His subordinates, not knowing Hooker's commander's intent, had no basis for acting without orders. Confident that Hooker would not attack, Lee again divided his forcefulness, allocating 25,000 men to fix Hooker and sending the rest to articulate the rear of Sedgwick. Sedgwick repelled this force but, thinking he was almost surrounded, retreated across the Rappahannock. Confronted with this, and having no contingency, Hooker abandoned his programme and withdrew his enveloping force. Hooker believed he had planned well (1-24"My plans are perfect, and when I start to carry them out, may God accept mercy on Bobby Lee; for I shall have none"), and his numerical reward should have compensated for many mistakes. Nonetheless, his plan was too rigid and relied besides much on expected reactions from Lee. Hooker withheld his intent from his subordinates until also late, thus denying them the ability to use their initiative. Lee, however, trusted his subordinates and confided his intent to them. He clearly assessed and adjusted to a situation as it unfolded, weighed the risks, and fabricated bold decisions. Despite being outnumbered two to one, he divided his force three times, accepting the risk of being defeated in item but allocating equally much of his limited resources as possible to his decisive functioning. Lee's orders were classic mission orders that allowed subordinates to exercise their initiative. He did not brand these decisions recklessly, simply but later advisedly assessing timely intelligence, interpreting enemy actions, consulting with subordinates, and knowing his enemy's character.
CONCLUSION
| 1-89. Although the systems commanders use to exercise C2 have evolved throughout history, the fundamental nature of C2 is timeless. Improvements in technology, system, and procedures may change the sophistication of C2, merely they have not inverse its importance. While these improvements appear to accept increased the bridge of control, they have barely kept pace with the increasing dispersion of forces and complexity of war machine operations. Any the historic period or technology, the key to constructive C2 is people using data to decide and to act wisely. Whatever the historic period or engineering, the ultimate benchmark of C2 success is always the same: acting faster and more effectively than the enemy to accomplish the mission at the least cost to the friendly forcefulness before the enemy can effectively act. i-xc. Army C2 doctrine calls for eliminating as much uncertainty as possible within the fourth dimension bachelor and managing whatever uncertainty remains. Mission control, a major aspect of this doctrine, uses decentralized execution to manage this dubiousness by distributing the handling of uncertainty throughout the strength. This doctrine of command and command rests on a supporting doctrine of command and 1 for command. Affiliate two discusses Army doctrine for command. The nature and science of command is the subject of affiliate three. |
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Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/chap1.htm
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